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INTRODUCTION
The flooding that accompanied Hurricane Katrina when it hit the
Gulf coast in the summer of 2005 made it one of the most costly disasters
in the history of the United States, both in terms of lives lost and prop-
erty damaged. Most of the nation perceived Hurricane Katrina as a ran-
dom and tragic act of nature.' Russ Knocke, a spokesperson for the
Department of Homeland Security, expressed the sentiments of many
when he simply said, "Mother Nature trumped the playbook."2 Others
saw a divine role in the calamity, with some even suggesting that Katrina
* J.D. candidate, Cornell Law School, 2008. Many thanks to Professors Douglas Kysar
and Keith Porter for their thoughtful comments and encouragement, and to my parents, the two
best lawyers I know.
I TED STEINBERG, ACTS OF GOD: THE UNNATURAL HISTORY OF NATURAL DISASTER IN
AMERICA 198 (2d ed. 2006).
2 Id.
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was "payback for the blood shed in abortion clinics"'3 or punishment for
a gay, lesbian, and bisexual street fair set to take place in New Orleans
just as the storm hit.4 It is certainly difficult to see a disaster of Katrina's
magnitude as anything other than the unpredictable and uncontrollable
act of some force larger than ourselves. But shockingly, Hurricane Ka-
trina was, in fact, one of the most accurately predicted and easily pre-
ventable disasters ever to take place. 5
More than forty percent of the nation's salt marshlands are in Loui-
siana.6 However, Louisiana may not have these marshlands for much
longer. Those along the coast are disappearing at a rate of one football
field-sized area every thirty-five minutes. 7 The loss of these wetlands is
significant because wetlands mitigate flooding and reduce the impact of
storm surges. 8 Thus, the erosion, in recent decades, of wetlands in south-
ern Louisiana has led to higher and faster storm surges than have ever
before occurred there. 9 Even though coastal communities have long de-
pended on a system of levees to protect them from the sea, 10 the tragic
events of Hurricane Katrina proved what scientists and journalists had
been suggesting for years,'1 that the levees were no longer enough to
compensate for the loss of the natural protection provided by the
wetlands. 12
In the wake of Katrina, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in a
case with profound implications for such regulations. In June of 2006,
the Court decided Rapanos v. United States, which dealt with the ques-
tion of whether wetlands adjacent to "navigable waters of the United
States" could be regulated under section 404 of the Clean Water Act.' 3
The plurality, per Justice Scalia, used textual arguments in support of its
conclusion that the Clean Water Act was intended to encompass only
"relatively permanent, standing or flowing bodies of water"'14 and that
3 Id. at xi.
4 id.
5 See id. at 198; see also Brian Handwerk, Louisiana Coasts Threatened by Wetlands
Loss, NAT'L GEOGRAPHiC NEWS, Feb. 9, 2005, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/
2005/02/0209_050209_wetlands.html.
6 Handwerk, supra note 5.
7 Id.
8 See EPA, WETLANDS OVERVIEW 3 (Dec. 2004), http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/
pdf/overview.pdf.
9 Handwerk, supra note 5.
10 Id.
I Id.
12 Id.; see also Press Release, Worldwatch Institute, Unnatural Disaster: The Lessons of
Katrina (Sept. 2, 2005), http://www.worldwatch.org/node/1822.
13 See Rapanos v. United States, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 2221 (2006).
14 Id.
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adjacent or abutting wetlands could not be regulated based on "mere hy-
drologic connection."15
This Note will argue that the Court's decision in Rapanos was con-
trary to both the purposes of the Clean Water Act and the Court's own
recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence. But it will further argue that in
light of the position taken by the Court in Rapanos, Congress should
regulate wetlands through other sections of the Clean Water Act or
through a federal land use statute such as the National Flood Insurance
Act, thus using cooperative federalism and state-based approaches to pre-
serve wetlands. Part I of this Note explains the functions and importance
of wetlands. Part II traces the history of federal wetlands regulation.
Part III details the Supreme Court's precedent interpreting the jurisdic-
tion of the Army Corps of Engineers over wetlands. Part IV explains the
impact of the Court's recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence on its
Clean Water Act decisions. Part V argues that the Court's decision in
Rapanos does not comport with its recent Commerce Clause decision in
Gonzales v. Raich. Part VI argues that the voluntary grant program con-
tained in section 319 of the Clean Water Act and the National Flood
Insurance Program could potentially be used to encourage states to de-
velop their own wetland protection programs, thereby avoiding the diffi-
culties associated with regulating wetlands through section 404 of the
Clean Water Act.
I. WETLANDS: FORM AND FUNCTION
Wetlands are the most biologically productive ecosystems in the
United States, 16 supporting a diversity of species comparable to that
found in tropical rainforests and coral reefs. 17 They perform a wide ar-
ray of critical ecosystem functions.1 8 First, wetlands act like sponges,
absorbing water and then slowly releasing it.19 This water-storing capac-
ity allows wetlands to have the effect of mitigating flooding by limiting
erosion and allowing groundwater to recharge. 20 In coastal areas, just
one mile of vegetated wetlands can reduce storm wave heights by as
much as a foot. 21
15 Id. at 2225.
16 Oliver A. Houck & Michael Rolland, Federalism in Wetlands Regulation: A Consid-
eration of Delegation of Clean Water Act Section 404 and Related Programs to the States, 54
MD. L. REV. 1242, 1243 (1995).
17 EPA, FUNCTIONS AND VALUES OF WETLANDS (2001), available at http://www.epa.
gov/owow/wetlands/pdf/fun-val.pdf [hereinafter FUNCTIONS AND VALUES OF WETLANDS].
18 Jeremy A. Colby, SWANCC: Full of Sound and Fury, Signifying Nothing ... Much?,
37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1017, 1055 (2004).
19 FUNCTIONS AND VALUES OF WETLANDS, supra note 17.
20 Id.
21 Houck & Rolland, supra note 16, at 1250.
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Further, wetlands act as natural pollution control systems. 22 Water
that has slowed as a result of encountering a wetland has less capacity to
carry sediment, and the water's movement around the many aquatic
plants found in wetlands further encourages the settling out of suspended
sediment and pollutants. 23 This natural filtration system has economic
benefits:
[Wetlands] remove heavy metals at efficiencies ranging
from twenty to one hundred percent. They remove up to
ninety-five percent of phosphorous, nutrients and con-
ventional pollutants, the equivalent of multi-million dol-
lar treatment systems. A recent report concludes that a
loss of fifty percent of America's remaining wetlands
would result in increased sewage treatment plant ex-
penditures of up to $75 billion for the removal of a sin-
gle pollutant, nitrogen, alone.24
Wetlands are also important for the sustainability of fisheries.25 It is
estimated that more than seventy percent of America's annual commer-
cial seafood harvest, valued in the billions of dollars, traces its origins to
"the shallow seagrasses and the salt, intermediate and brackish marshes
of coastal estuaries. '26 "Wetlands provide an essential link in the life
cycle of seventy-five percent of the fish and shellfish commercially har-
vested in the U.S."'27 Catches of crab, shrimp, and salmon, all dependent
on wetlands during some part of their life cycle, were estimated at $1.167
trillion in 2004.28
Even "isolated" wetlands serve many of these same functions, espe-
cially in areas that are otherwise relatively dry, such as the western re-
gions of the United States.29 Moreover, the very concept of an "isolated"
wetland is questionable, since virtually all wetlands, even those which do
not share a surface water connection to any other body of water, are
connected to other bodies of water through groundwater. 30
The capacity of a wetland to carry out the functions described above
is not directly proportional to its size. A wetland's size affects both its
water storage capacity and the rate at which it can carry out evapotrans-
22 Id. at 1245.
23 FUNCTIONS AND VALUES OF WETLANDS, supra note 17.
24 Houck & Rolland, supra note 16, at 1245.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 1247.
27 EPA, ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF WETLANDS 2 (May 2006), http://www.epa.gov/owowl
wetlands/pdf/EconomicBenefits.pdf.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Kimberly Breedon, The Reach of Raich: Implications for Legislative Amendments and
Judicial Interpretations of the Clean Water Act, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1441, 1443 (2006).
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piration (loss of water by evaporation) and infiltration (absorption of
water). 3' The loss of only a small amount of wetland may result in a
dramatic loss of wetland function.32 Nonetheless, even small wetlands
are worth preserving, since they play a complementary role to the large
wetlands in the ecosystems in which they exist. 33 While only large wet-
land systems can have a substantial impact on peak levels of larger, more
infrequent floods, small wetlands reduce and delay peak levels of
smaller, more frequent floods.34
II. A HISTORY OF FEDERAL WETLANDS REGULATION
Wetland regulation is, at heart, a land use issue. Land use in gen-
eral, and intrastate navigable waters in particular, are traditional areas of
state sovereignty.35 This traditional state power is, however, limited by
federal authority to regulate interstate navigation.36 The Commerce
Clause of the Federal Constitution grants Congress the authority to "reg-
ulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several states." 37
Although the Constitution does not mention federal regulation of naviga-
tion specifically, the intimate connection between commerce and naviga-
tion has long been perceived, and courts have presumed since the earliest
days of Commerce Clause jurisprudence that Congress must have some
ability to regulate navigation if it is to effectively regulate interstate
commerce.
38
Although the Supreme Court has long acknowledged Congress's au-
thority to regulate navigation as part of its commerce power, the Court
interpreted that power quite narrowly in the early part of the nation's
history. 39 This was partly the result of a fairly narrow interpretation of
the commerce power as a whole.40 The Court read the Commerce
Clause as applying only to goods which actually moved interstate, focus-
ing exclusively on where the relevant activity took place (either intrastate
31 Id.
32 Colby, supra note 18, at 1058.
33 Joy B. Zedler, Wetlands at Your Service: Reducing Impacts of Agriculture at the Wa-
tershed Scale, 1 FRONTIERS IN ECOLOGY & ENV'T 65, 67, available at http://www.esajournals.
org/perlserv/?request=get-toc&;ssn= I 540-9295&volume= 1 &issue=2.
34 Id.
35 Bradford C. Mank, The Murky Future of the Clean Water Act After SWANCC: Using a
Hydrological Connection Approach to Saving the Clean Water Act, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 811,
823 (2003).
36 Id.
37 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
38 Mank, supra note 35, at 824 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 190
(1824), in which Chief Justice Marshall argued that "[t]he mind can scarcely conceive a sys-
tem for regulating commerce between nations, which shall exclude all laws concerning
navigation.").
39 See id. at 825.
40 See id.
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or interstate) and not on the activity's ultimate impact on interstate com-
merce as a whole.4 ' Thus, the Court interpreted the Commerce Clause to
grant Congress power only to regulate navigation involving the actual
interstate transportation of commercial goods.42 In keeping with this no-
tion of a limited commerce power, the Court interpreted Congress's navi-
gation power as extending only to those waters that were in fact
navigable. 43
Beginning in the late nineteenth century, however, the scope of
Congress's power to regulate navigable waters as part of its Commerce
Clause authority gradually began to expand. 44 This was initially due to
Supreme Court decisions holding that the federal government did have
authority to regulate non-navigable waters that had significant effects on
navigable waters. 45 The expansion of the navigation power was also fu-
eled by Congress's enactment of the River and Harbors Act in 1890,46
which allowed the Secretary of War to protect navigable waters from
obstruction. 47 The Supreme Court acknowledged a new and broader con-
ception of the federal power to control waters when it upheld the River
and Harbors Act in United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co.48
The Court held that activities in non-navigable waters or portions of wa-
ters were within the Act's jurisdiction when they affected navigable
waters.49
Section 13 of the 1899 Act, commonly referred to as the Refuse
Act,50 was a further expansion of Congress's power to control non-navi-
gable waters. The Refuse Act prohibited discharging refuse "into any
navigable water of the United States, or into any tributary of any naviga-
ble water from which the same shall float or be washed into such naviga-
ble water." 51 The Act thus extended Congress's authority over navigable
41 Id.
42 Id. f.
43 Id. (citing The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1871), which defined naviga-
ble waters of the United States as those "form[ed] in their ordinary condition by themselves, or
by uniting with other waters, a continued highway over which commerce is or may be carried
on with other States or foreign countries in the customary modes in which such commerce is
conducted by water).
'4 Id.
45 Id.
46 Act of Sept. 19, 1890, ch. 907, § 7, 26 Stat. 454 (amended 1892).
47 Id.
48 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
49 Id. at 696-702, 707-10. Congress amended the River and Harbor Act in 1899 to
address perceived ambiguities in the Act. River and Harbor Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 401
(2003); see also Mank, supra note 35, at 826-27. The 1899 Act used the broader term "waters
of the United States" in addition to "navigable water[s] of the United States," and it required
congressional consent or a permit from the Corps before any construction in such waters. Act
of Mar. 3, 1899, ch. 425, § 9, 30 Stat. 1151.
50 33 U.S.C. § 407.
51 Id.
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waters to include refuse added to non-navigable tributaries of those
waters.52
Beginning in 1937, the Supreme Court changed its approach to the
Commerce Clause as a whole, moving away from its historically narrow
interpretation and towards a broader approach. In National Labor Rela-
tions Board v. Jones Laughlin Steel Corp.,53 the Court held that Congress
had the authority, under the Commerce Clause, to regulate not only inter-
state activities, but also intrastate activities that "have such a close and
substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential
or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and
obstructions."'54
As the Court's interpretation of the Commerce Clause became more
expansive, so too did its definition of "navigable waters." In United
States v. Appalachian Power Co.,55 the Court held that Congress "had
authority under the Commerce Clause to promote the development of
electric power under the Federal Power Act even if those purposes did
not serve navigation needs."'56 The Court reasoned that "flood protec-
tion, watershed development measures, [and] recovery of the cost of im-
provements by utilization of power"57 fell within the purview of
Congress's commerce power because they were the inevitable "by-prod-
ucts" of using waterways for commerce. 58 Thus, the Court affirmed the
notion that "navigable waters" could include waters used for "a wider
range of purposes than just navigation."'59 A year after Appalachian
Power, the Court further expanded federal jurisdiction in State of
Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co.,60 holding that "Con-
gress may exercise its control over the non-navigable stretches of a river
in order to preserve and promote commerce on the navigable portions. 61
Beginning in the 1950s, the political climate in the United States
changed in ways that profoundly affected both the legislative and judicial
approach to environmental issues. Strong evidence of widespread envi-
ronmental damage began to surface. 62 Books such as Aldo Leopold's A
52 See Mank, supra note 35, at 827-28.
53 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
54 Id. at 36-39.
55 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
56 Mank, supra note 35, at 829.
57 Appalachian Power Co., 311 U.S. at 426.
58 Id.; see also Mank, supra note 35, at 829.
59 Mank, supra note 35, at 829. The Appalachian Power Court also expanded the defini-
tion of "navigable waters" beyond currently navigable waters to include potentially navigable
waters. See Appalachian Power Co., 311 U.S. at 427.
60 313 U.S. 508 (1941).
61 Id. at 523.
62 Jory Ruggiero, Toward a Law of the Land: The Clean Water Act as a Federal Man-
date for the Implementation of an Ecosystem Approach to Land Management, 20 Pua. LAND &
REs. L. REV. 31, 39 (1999).
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Sand County Almanac,63 and later Rachel Carson's Silent Spring,64
dramatized these problems, focusing public attention on environmental
issues and to sparking a popular environmental movement. 65 By the
1970s, this movement had gained enough strength to generate an "amaz-
ing expansion in environmental law and regulation. ' 66 For the first time,
environmental protection became one of the federal government's funda-
mental responsibilities. 67
The "environmental decade" of the 1970s began with the passage of
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) on January 1, 1970.68
Instead of trying to attack any specific environmental problem by means
of a regulatory scheme, NEPA attempted to achieve environmental goals
by "mandat[ing] a significant change in the decision-making procedure
used by federal agencies."'69 NEPA required federal agencies to consider
the likely environmental impacts of their activities and to report their
findings in an environmental impact statement. 70 It also required federal
agencies to investigate alternatives that would have a smaller environ-
mental impact. 71 NEPA thus recognized that, in the environmental con-
text, even localized activities must be evaluated in terms of their effects
on their ecosystem as a whole.
NEPA was the first major piece of federal legislation to endorse the
idea of ecosystem-level management as a legal concept. 72 It was fol-
lowed by a series of federal environmental regulations passed in the early
1970s based on this premise. 73 Water pollution control was one of the
most notable areas in which the idea of ecosystem level management was
quickly applied. Legislators and policymakers initially turned to the Riv-
ers and Harbors Act as a tool for controlling water pollution on a sys-
63 See generally ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND CouNTy ALMANAC (1949).
64 See generally RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1964).
65 Ruggiero, supra note 62, at 39.
66 Id.
67 NANCY S. PHILIPPI, FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT-EcOLOGIC AND ECONOMIC PERSPEC-
TIVES 55 (R.G. Landes Company 1996).
68 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (2000).
69 ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POL-
ICY 796 (5th ed. 2006).
70 § 102(2)(c).
71 § 102(2)(e).
72 See Ruggiero, supra note 62, at 39-40.
73 See, e.g., Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C §§ 7401-7671(q) (1994)); Marine Protection, Research, and
Sanctuaries Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-532, 86 Stat. 973 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1401-1445 (1994)); Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 92-
500, 86 Stat. 896 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994)); Endangered Spe-
cies Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 885 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1531-1534 (1994)); 1974 Safe Drinking Water Act, Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Star. 1661
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300(f)-O)(26) (1994)).
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temic level. 74 This proved to be difficult because the Army Corps of
Engineers (Corps) traditionally used its jurisdiction under the Rivers and
Harbors Act to focus on navigation rather than on pollution control.7 5
Serious questions began to arise about whether the Corps could extend
its jurisdiction under the Rivers and Harbors Act beyond direct effects on
navigation to effects on the environment more generally. 76 It was in this
context and spirit that Congress promulgated the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972, or the Clean Water Act (CWA).77
The 1972 CWA was designed to "restore and maintain the chemi-
cal, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters. '78 In order
to achieve this goal, the CWA created a framework that uses Water
Quality Standards, 79 Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs) for non-
point source pollutants,80 and a system of permits that must be acquired
before dredged or fill material can be discharged from a point source into
navigable waters.81 These provisions are intended to guide states to-
wards national water quality goals 82 and thus to create "a comprehensive
approach to regulating pollution and improving the quality of the na-
tion's waters."'83
Central to the CWA is a prohibition against "discharge of any pollu-
tant by any person" into covered waters.8 4 However, the CWA carves
out a series of exceptions to this default rule. One of these exceptions,
which is most frequently implicated in the context of wetland manage-
ment and use, is section 404 of the CWA, which requires that:
Any discharge of dredged or fill material into the navi-
gable waters incidental to any activity having as its pur-
pose bringing an area of the navigable waters into a use
to which it was not previously subject, where the flow or
circulation of navigable waters may be impaired or the
reach of such waters be reduced [is] required to have a
permit [issued by the Army Corps of Engineers.] 85
74 Virginia S. Albrecht & Stephen M. Nickelsburg, Could SWANCC Be Right? A New
Look at the Legislative History of the Clean Water Act, 32 ENVTL. L. INST. 11042, 11045
(2002).
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
78 33 U.S.C. § 1251.
79 33 U.S.C. § 1313.
80 Id.
81 33 U.S.C. § 1344. These permits are referred to as National Pollution Discharge Elim-
ination System (NPDES) permits. See id.
82 PERCIVAL Er AL., supra note 69, at 594-95.
83 Mank, supra note 35, at 831.
84 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a).
85 33 U.S.C. § 1344(0(2).
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Section 404 of the CWA has been referred to as "[t]he centerpiece
of federal wetlands regulation," 86 and as "the most significant federal
regulatory scheme related to wetlands protection." 87
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) holds primary respon-
sibility for administering the CWA. 88 However, section 404 of the CWA
is co-administered by the Army Corps of Engineers.8 9 The substantive
criteria used in determining when a section 404 permit should be granted
are set out in regulations which the EPA and the Corps promulgate to-
gether,90 and the permit program is subsequently administered by the
Corps alone. 91 Additionally, the EPA has "veto" authority over the
Corps's permitting decisions,92 and both agencies have enforcement au-
thority.93 The scope of the Corps and EPA's jurisdiction is the same for
all of the Act's provisions, including section 404: "navigable waters. '94
The term navigable waters is vaguely and somewhat circularly defined in
the CWA as "the waters of the United States, including the territorial
seas." 95
Although they co-administer section 404, the EPA and the Corps
initially had very different definitions of navigable waters. Under the
River and Harbors Act, the Corps historically interpreted its jurisdiction
as extending only to traditionally navigable waters, such as lakes and
rivers. 96 When the CWA was initially promulgated in 1972, the Corps
continued to use a relatively narrow definition of the term navigable wa-
ters,97 construing it to cover only waters that were navigable in fact.98
This was in direct conflict with the regulatory definition published by the
EPA in 1973, which adopted a relatively expansive definition of the nav-
igable waters falling under its CWA jurisdiction.99 Then, in response to
the D.C. Circuit's decision in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Cal-
laway,1°° the Corps expanded its definition.10' The Corps's new regula-
86 Houck & Rolland, supra note 16, at 1243.
87 Peter N. Davis, Wetlands Preservation, in 5 WATERS AND WATER RIrrs 830 (Robert
E. Beck et al. eds., Lexis Law Publishing 1991) (1988).
88 Donna M. Downing, Cathy Winer & Lance D. Wood, Navigating Through Clean
Water Act Jurisdiction: A Legal Review, 23 WETLANDS 475, 478 (2003).
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (1994).
95 Clean Water Act § 502(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2005).
96 See Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehlke, 578 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1978).
97 Downing, Winer & Wood, supra note 88, at 480.
98 PERCIVAL T AL, supra note 69, at 600.
99 Id.
too Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975).
1l Mank, supra note 35, at 834.
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tions defined navigable waters to include: (1) tributaries of navigable
waters; (2) interstate waters and their tributaries; (3) non-navigable intra-
state waters whose use or misuse could affect interstate commerce, and;
(4) all freshwater wetlands that were adjacent to waters covered under
the Act. 10 2 The Corps's interpretation of navigable waters has continued
to expand since then, and the CWA, including section 404, now covers
"all waters of the United States." 103
If determining the meaning of the term navigable waters has been
difficult, determining how wetlands fit into that category has been even
more so. Part of the reason that the term wetland has been problematic
in the context of section 404 is that, although a wetland has a biological
and ecological identity, "the term, as it is used in section 404, is jurisdic-
tional in nature, not scientific." 104 Only wetlands whose use affects in-
terstate commerce are subject to the Corps's jurisdiction under the
CWA. 105 Wetlands that traditionally fell under the jurisdiction of the
Corps, as defined by the CWA, included: (1) wetlands that were used or
could be used by migratory birds, and as such could affect interstate
commerce (often referred to as the "Migratory Bird Rule"); (2) wetlands
that abutted surface watercourses, and; (3) wetlands adjacent to surface
water courses. 106 These adjacent wetlands were "areas inundated or sat-
urated by surface or groundwater at a frequency and duration sufficient
to support . . . a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in
saturated soil conditions."'10 7
This broad interpretation of the Corps's jurisdiction over wetlands
under section 404 held sway until as recently as the 1980s.10 8 The term
"adjacent wetlands" was also construed quite broadly. For example, a
road separating a swamp from a river did not preclude the exercise of the
Corps's jurisdiction over adjacent wetlands. 10 9 The Corps even at-
tempted to use section 404 to assert jurisdiction over certain isolated wet-
102 Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters or Ocean Waters, 40 Fed. Reg. 31320 (July
25, 1975).
103 Clean Water Act § 502(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7)(2005).
104 Davis, supra note 87, at 834.
105 Id. at 831.
106 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(7) (1996); see also United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204 (7th
Cir. 1979); Hobbs v. United States, 947 F.2d 941 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 940
(1992).
107 33 C.F.R. §328.3(b) (1996); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474
U.S. 121 (1985).
108 See Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 128-29 (stating that a narrow construction
is not necessary to avoid a takings problem).
109 See United States v. Tilton, 17 E.R.C. 1891 (M.D. Fla. 1982) affid, 705 F.2d 429 (11 th
Cir. 1983); see also United States v. Ciampiti, 583 F. Supp. 483 (D.N.J. 1984).
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lands used by migratory waterfowl. 10 In recent years, however, the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Corps's jurisdiction under section
404 has become increasingly restrictive.
III. SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF
FEDERAL WETLANDS JURISDICTION
Deciding where and how to draw the line between water and land
can prove surprisingly difficult, and Rapanos was not the first case in
which the Court was asked to interpret the meaning of "waters of the
United States" in the context of wetlands. The Court addressed this issue
in two prior cases, United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. "'1 and
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers.'1 2 Like Rapanos, both of these cases addressed the question:
when is a wetland sufficiently closely related to a navigable water to
bring it within the Corps's jurisdiction under section 404 of the CWA?
A. RIVERSIDE BAYVIEW HOMES' 1 3
The Riverside Bayview Homes case arose because the respondent,
Riverside Bayview Homes, owned a piece of "marshy land" near Lake
St. Clair in Michigan on which it planned to construct a housing develop-
ment.114 In preparation for construction, Riverside Bayview Homes be-
gan to place fill materials on the land. 115 On the theory that the property
constituted an "adjacent wetland" under the 1975 Corps regulation, 116
the Corps sued to enjoin Riverside Bayview Homes from filling the wet-
land because the builder did not obtain a valid section 404 permit from
the Corps. 117 The District Court granted the injunction. 118 The Sixth
Circuit reversed, "constru[ing] the Corps's regulations to exclude from
the category of adjacent wetlands ... wetlands that were not subject to
flooding by adjacent navigable waters at a frequency sufficient to support
the growth of aquatic vegetation."'"19
110 See United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d. 1317 (6th Cir. 1974);
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975); Davis, supra
note 87, at 831.
II' See Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 121.
112 Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159
(2001).
113 Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 121.
114 Id. at 124.
115 Id.
116 See Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters or Ocean Waters, 40 Fed. Reg. 31320
(July 25, 1975) (stating that the Corps Jurisdiction under section 404 includes "navigable wa-
ters," which could extend to wetlands adjacent to coastal waters, including marshes).
117 Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 124.
118 Id. at 125.
119 Id.
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The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Sixth Circuit, declar-
ing that "[a]n agency's construction of a statute it is charged with enforc-
ing is entitled to deference if it is reasonable and not in conflict with the
expressed intent of Congress." 120 Therefore, the Court set out to address
"whether it is reasonable, in light of the language, policies, and legisla-
tive history of the Act for the Corps to exercise jurisdiction over wet-
lands adjacent to, but not regularly flooded by, rivers, streams, and other
hydrographic features more conventionally identifiable as 'waters."", 21
Examining the legislative history of the CWA, the Court found that, in
promulgating the Act, Congress had adopted an expansive definition of
"waters" in order to reflect the broad underlying purposes of the
CWA. 122 According to Justice White's opinion in Riverside, the CWA
originated not as an attempt to grant the Corps jurisdiction over naviga-
ble waters for commercial or economic purposes, but rather as an attempt
to create a mechanism by which to "restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."' 123 Taking the
broad systemic purposes of the CWA into account and acknowledging
evidence presented by the EPA demonstrating the close hydrological and
ecological connections between wetlands and the waters they adjoin, the
Court determined that the Corps's conclusion that adjacent wetlands
were covered by section 404 of the CWA was reasonable. 124
B. SOLID WASTE AGENCY OF NORTHERN COOK COUNTY V. U.S.
ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS
The Court was not asked to interpret the meaning of navigable wa-
ters under the CWA again until 2001 in Solid Waste Agency of Northern
Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC). 125 The
SWANCC case arose when the solid waste agency in Cook County, Illi-
nois proposed to use an abandoned sand and gravel pit mine as a land-
fill. 126 The excavation trenches left on the land by the mining had
become seasonal or permanent ponds. The Army Corps of Engineers,
however, initially declined to assert jurisdiction because there were no
adjacent navigable waters that would convert the ponds into jurisdic-
tional wetlands. However, when it was discovered that the site provided
120 Id. at 131 (citing Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S.
116, 125 (1985); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-45 (1984)).
121 Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 131.
122 Id. at 132-33.
123 Id. This is the declared goal of the Clean Water Act. Clean Water Act § 101, 33
U.S.C. § 1251 (2002 & Supp. 2004).
124 Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 134.
125 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
126 Id. at 163.
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a temporary habitat to over 100 species of migratory birds each year, the
Corps did assert jurisdiction under the so-called "Migratory Bird Rule."
This rule is found in a 1986 version of the CWA, which states that sec-
tion 404(a) extends to intrastate waters:
a) Which are or would be used as habitat by birds protected by
Migratory Bird Treaties; or
b) Which are or would be used as habitat by other migratory birds
which cross state lines; or
c) Which are or would be used as habitat for endangered species; or
d) Which are or would be used to irrigate crops sold in interstate
commerce. 127
SWANCC challenged the Corps's authority, but the Seventh Circuit
upheld the Corps's jurisdiction. 12 8 The Corps's victory, however, was
short-lived.
The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit in a close five to
four decision. 129 In an opinion delivered by then-Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, the Court distinguished SWANCC from Riverside Bayview
Homes.130 Rehnquist argued that the holding in Riverside Bayview
Homes was "based in large measure upon Congress['s] unequivocal ac-
quiescence to, and approval of, the Corps['s] regulations interpreting the
CWA to cover wetlands adjacent to navigable waters" given the "signifi-
cant nexus" between the adjacent wetlands and "navigable waters."'131
The Court found that the required nexus was lacking in the SWANCC
case, where the wetlands at issue were not directly adjacent to any waters
covered by the CWA. 132
The SWANCC decision thus "eliminated 'CWA jurisdiction over
isolated, intrastate, non-navigable waters where the sole basis for assert-
ing CWA jurisdiction is the actual or potential use of the waters as
habitat for migratory birds.""133 SWANCC arguably did not affect the
Corps's jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to waters of the United
States, as it technically involved neither wetlands nor adjacency.' 34
Nonetheless, it generated a considerable amount of litigation over the
meaning of "isolated," "adjacent," and "significant nexus."'135 And
whatever its ultimate doctrinal meaning, SWANCC had a substantial
practical effect on wetlands protection. It is estimated that up to twenty
127 Id. at 161 (referring to the Migratory Bird Rule, 51 Fed. Reg. 41217).
128 Id. at 166.
129 Id.
130 See id. at 167-68.
131 Id. at 167.
132 Id. at 167-68
.133 Colby, supra note 18, at 1030.
134 Id. at 1030-31.
135 Id. at 1031.
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percent of the nation's wetlands are isolated and thus no longer receive
the protection they previously enjoyed as a result of SWANCC. 136
IV. THE INFLUENCE OF LOPEZ, MORRISON, AND RAICH
The Court's decision in SWANCC was heavily influenced by its de-
cisions in two Commerce Clause cases which, at the time of SWANCC,
were relatively new. In United States v. Morrison137 and United States v.
Lopez, ' 38 the Court "reaffirmed the proposition that the grant of authority
to Congress under the Commerce Clause, though broad, is not unlim-
ited." 139 These decisions were highly relevant to the SWANCC case be-
cause it was the commerce power that Congress relied on for the
authority to regulate navigable waters through the CWA. 140 Using the
commerce power to regulate isolated wetlands because they provided
habitat to migratory bird species which crossed state lines, Justice Rehn-
quist argued, "invokes the outer limits of Congress's power" under the
Commerce Clause. 141 In such a situation, the Corps would be required to
provide a "clear indication that Congress intended that result."' 42 The
Court found that no such clear indication had been shown in the
SWANCC case.
A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SUPREME COURT COMMERCE CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE
It was in Gibbons v. Ogden143 that the Court first articulated the
nature of Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause. 144 Com-
merce, said the Gibbons Court, "undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is some-
thing more: it is intercourse. It describes the commercial intercourse
between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated
by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse."'' 45 For almost a
century following its decision in Gibbons, the Court's Commerce Clause
jurisprudence focused almost entirely on the Commerce Clause as a limit
on state legislative power, and hardly at all on the Commerce Clause as a
limit on Congress's power.146 With the Shreveport Rate Cases, however,
136 Id. at 1056.
137 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
138 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
139 Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159,
173 (2001).
140 See id. at 162 (stating that one question on certiorari is whether Congress's actions are
consistent with its authority under the Commerce Clause).
141 Id. at 172.
142 Id.
143 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
144 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 553 (1995).
145 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 189-90 (1824).
146 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 553.
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the Court turned its attention to the limits of federal power under the
Commerce Clause, holding that "where the interstate and intrastate as-
pects of commerce were so mingled together that future regulation of
interstate commerce required incidental regulation of intrastate com-
merce, the Commerce Clause authorized such regulation."'' 47
A series of the Court's subsequent decisions drew the outer bounds
of Congress's commerce power using the Shreveport Rate distinction be-
tween direct and indirect effects on interstate commerce. 48 However,
significant changes in the way business was conducted combined with a
sense that the Commerce Clause cases had artificially constrained Con-
gress's authority, eventually brought about a doctrinal shift. 149 In the
1937 landmark case of NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Court de-
clined to draw a distinction between direct and indirect effects on inter-
state commerce but instead asked whether the effects were substantial. ' 50
In sustaining federal labor laws that applied to manufacturing facili-
ties, 151 the Court demonstrated its "definitive commitment to the practi-
cal conception of the commerce power."'152
This trend continued into the 1940s when, in the case of United
States v. Darby,153 the Court held that:
The power of Congress over interstate commerce is not
confined to the regulation of commerce among the
states. It extends to those activities intrastate which so
affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power
of Congress over it as to make regulation of them appro-
priate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the
exercise of the granted power of Congress to regulate
interstate commerce. 154
By 1942, in Wickard v. Filburn, the Court disavowed "the entire
line of direct-indirect ... cases"'155 and determined that "broader inter-
147 Id. at 554 (citing Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States (Shreveport Rate
Cases), 234 U.S. 342 (1914)).
148 See, e.g., A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1914); see
also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 555 ("Activities that affected interstate commerce directly were within
Congress's power; activities that affected interstate commerce indirectly were beyond Con-
gress's reach.").
149 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556.
150 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (stating, "The question [of the scope congressional power under
the Commerce Clause] is necessarily one of degree.").
151 See id. at 22-25, 29, 49.
152 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 573.
153 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
154 Id. at 118; see also Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 11I, 128-29 (1942) (explicitly re-
jecting the distinction between direct and indirect effects).
155 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 573 (quoting Wickard, 317 U.S. at 122).
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pretations of the Commerce Clause [were] destined to supersede the ear-
lier ones."'1 56
B. LOPEZ, MORRISON, AND RAICH
This broader approach to Commerce Clause jurisprudence contin-
ued until 1995, when the Court decided United States v. Lopez. At issue
in Lopez was the Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990,157 which made it a
federal offense to possess a firearm in a school zone.' 58 The majority,
per Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that the Gun-Free School Zone Act
exceeded Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause. 159 The
Court struck down the statute because, among other things, it found that:
(1) the activity it attempted to regulate, the possession of a gun in a
school zone, was not an economic activity; (2) it was not an essential part
of a larger regulatory scheme relating to an interstate economic activity
which could be undercut unless the intrastate activity was regulated, 160
and; (3) the link between gun possession in school zones and interstate
commerce was too attenuated.' 6' The Lopez majority argued that "if we
accept the Government's arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any
activity by any individual that Congress is without power to regulate."' 62
Similarly, in United States v. Morrison,163 the Court held that a pro-
vision of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) providing for a
federal civil remedy for gender-motivated violent crimes exceeded Con-
gress's commerce power. As with the Gun-Free School Zone Act in Lo-
pez, the Morrison Court held that the provision fell outside the bounds of
congressional authority because gender-motivated violent crimes "[were]
not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity"'164 and because the
connection between such crimes and interstate commerce was too attenu-
ated to fall into the "substantial effect" category. 165
The Court's decision in Gonzales v. Raich appeared to break the
trend towards a narrower Commerce Clause. 166 Raich involved Califor-
nia's Compassionate Use Act (CUA), 167 which permits those who are
156 Id.
157 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1988).
158 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
159 Id.
160 See id. at 561.
161 The proffered link was that guns in school zones lead to increased violent crime,
which interferes with education, which has a detrimental affect on interstate commerce. See
id. at 563-64.
162 Id. at 564.
163 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
164 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
165 Id. at 615-16.
166 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 2 (2005).
167 CAL. HEALTH & SAFEYr CODE § 11362.5 (2007).
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seriously ill to use marijuana for medical purposes. 168 The Act creates
an exemption from criminal prosecution for "a patient, or ... a patient's
primary caregiver, who possesses or cultivates marijuana for the personal
medical purposes of the patient upon the written or oral recommendation
or approval of a physician."' 169 The respondents in Raich were using
marijuana in accordance with the CUA but were nonetheless prosecuted
under the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA).170 The question
before the Raich Court was whether the provisions in the CSA prohibit-
ing personal use of marijuana for medicinal purposes were valid exer-
cises of Congress's Commerce Clause authority. 7 1 The Court held that
the CSA was within the bounds of Congress's commerce power. The
Raich majority distinguished Lopez, arguing that, unlike the Gun Free
School Zone Act, the CSA "was a lengthy and detailed statute creating a
comprehensive framework for regulating the production, distribution,
and possession of five classes of 'controlled substances." ' 172 Although
the personal consumption of homegrown marijuana engaged in by the
respondents in Raich was concededly a purely intrastate activity, the
Court found that the prohibition of this activity was part of "a larger
regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be
undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated."' 73 The Raich
Court accordingly found the CSA to be valid as an essential part of a
broader regulatory scheme.1 74
In light of the Supreme Court's broad interpretation of Congress's
commerce power in Raich, courts tended to interpret the Supreme
Court's holding in SWANCC quite narrowly; they read it as restricting
the Corps's jurisdiction over wetlands only where jurisdiction "turned
solely on the potential presence of migratory birds."' 175 Disagreement
among the circuits as to the scope of SWANCC prompted the Supreme
Court to grant certiorari on two Sixth Circuit decisions "that upheld fed-
eral jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to non-navigable tributaries of
168 See Raich, 545 U.S. at 5-6.
169 § 11362.5(d).
170 See Raich, 545 U.S. at 7.
171 Id. at 5.
172 Id. at 24.
173 Id. at 24-25 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)).
174 Rapanos v. United States, 126 S.Ct. 2208 (2006) (No. 04-1034 (U.S. June 19, 2006)
and No. 04-1384 (U.S. June 19, 2006)).
175 PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 69, at 608; see United States v. Gerke Excavating, Co.,
412 F.3d 804, 807-08 (7th Cir. 2005); Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 386 F.3d 993,
1009 (11 th Cir. 2004); United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 2003); Headwaters, Inc.
v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526, 533-34 (9th Cir. 2001). But see in re Needham, 354
F.3d 340, 344-46 (5th Cir. 2003); Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264, 268-69 (5th
Cir. 2001).
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navigable waters"176 -United States v. Rapanos177 and Carabell v. U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers.178
In United States v. Rapanos, John Rapanos owned three wetland
properties in Michigan; two properties were connected by drain, the
other by surface connection, and all were connected either to a river or to
Lake Huron. 179 In 1989, Rapanos began to fill these lands even though
he was advised both by the state and by an independent consultant that
doing so without a permit was a violation of the Clean Water Act.180 He
proceeded "in open defiance of both a state cease-and-desist order and an
EPA administrative compliance order."' 181 As a result of this unautho-
rized filling, Rapanos was convicted of criminal violations of CWA sec-
tion 404.182 The Rapanos case was joined with the Carabell case, in
which the Carabells sought to fill a wetland in order to build condomini-
ums. 183 The wetland at issue in Carabell was near a drainage ditch
which, through a series of connections, ultimately directed water to Lake
St. Clair near the Michigan-Ohio border.' 84 The wetland was separated
from a drainage ditch by a four-foot wide, man-made "berm."l 8 5 In both
Rapanos and Carabell, the Sixth Circuit upheld the Corps's jurisdic-
tion. 186 On certiorari, Justice Scalia, writing for a plurality, framed the
question as whether "four Michigan wetlands, which lie near ditches or
man-made drains that eventually empty into traditional navigable waters,
constitute 'waters of the United States' within the meaning of the [Clean
Water] Act."' 187
The plurality vacated and remanded the Sixth Circuit judgments,
holding that section 404 of the CWA only covers wetlands adjacent to
''waters of the United States" and not wetlands adjacent to non-navigable
drainage ditches connected to navigable waters.188 Justice Scalia argued
that "our prior and subsequent judicial constructions of [the term water],
clear evidence from other provisions of the statute, and this Court's ca-
nons of construction all confirm that 'the waters of the United States' in
176 PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 69, at 608.
177 376 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2004).
178 391 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2004).
179 Id. at 2219; see also The Supreme Court, 2005 Term-]. Clean Water Act: Federal
Jurisdiction Over Navigable Waters, 120 HARV. L. REV. 351, 353 (2006) [hereinafter The
Supreme Court, 2005 Term].
180 The Supreme Court, 2005 Term, supra note 179, at 353.
181 PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 69, at 608.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Rapanos v. United States, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 2219 (2006).
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 2235.
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§1362(7) cannot bear the expansive meaning that the Corps would give
it."189
V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF RAPANOS
Federal regulation of land use, especially in the context of wetland
protection, is a highly controversial and politicized issue. The plurality
in Rapanos reached an ideological solution to this problem rather than a
legal one.
The decision in Rapanos was inconsistent with the underlying pur-
pose of the Clean Water Act. "A predicate of the Act . . . has been that
clean water and related wetland values inhere to the entire nation and that
a federal program is necessary to protect, restore, and maintain them." 190
The Court adopted a strict textualist approach, arguing that to allow the
Corps the jurisdiction it was seeking would leave the term navigable
without any significant meaning. 19 1 The Court further asserted that the
use of "waters" indicated that the statute did not refer to water in general,
but rather only to relatively permanent waters such as oceans, rivers,
lakes and other bodies of water which form more conventional geo-
graphic features. 192
In taking this approach, the Court disregarded the substantial body
of scientific evidence indicating that wetlands affect all the bodies of
water in proximity to them, such that any jurisdictional separation be-
tween traditionally "navigable waters" and the wetlands near them is es-
sentially meaningless. 19 3 In addition, the Court ignored the fundamental
and explicitly stated goal of the CWA, to create a comprehensive scheme
to maintain the integrity of the nation's water systems as a whole, an
objective requiring that wetland preservation be taken into account.
In addition, Rapanos is inconsistent with the Court's recent decision
in Raich. Although Rapanos deals with the reasonableness of the Corps's
interpretation of its jurisdiction under section 404 and not the constitu-
tionality of section 404 itself, the Court addresses the constitutional issue
in dicta.194 According to the Rapanos Court, "The extensive federal ju-
risdiction urged by the Government would authorize the Corps to func-
tion as a de facto regulator of immense stretches of intrastate land."'195
The Court argued that "the Corps' interpretation stretches the outer limits
of Congress's commerce power and raises difficult questions about the
189 Id. at 2220.
190 Houck & Rolland, supra note 16, at 1243.
191 See Rapanos, 126 U.S. at 2220-21.
192 See id. at 2222.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 2224.
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ultimate scope of that power,"' 196 thus suggesting that it was beyond the
scope of Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate
wetlands adjacent to tributaries.
This view does not comport with the Court's decision in Raich. In
Raich, the Court explained that congressional regulation of intrastate ac-
tivities was a valid exercise of Congress's commerce power where it was
an essential part of a comprehensive statutory framework regulating an
activity which had substantial effects on interstate cormnerce. The use of
the nation's waterways for transportation and commerce, for the produc-
tion of power and electricity, and even for recreational and tourism pur-
poses, plays a central role in interstate commerce and in the functioning
of the national economy. In addition, the dredge and fill activities regu-
lated by section 404 are typically engaged in by "commercial actors for a
commercial profit." 197 If the Corps is unable to regulate the use of wet-
lands that have a hydrological connection to navigable waters, it will lose
an essential mechanism for maintaining the integrity of the nation's wa-
terways as whole. If the integrity of the nation's waterways is not main-
tained, our ability to carryout all of the aforementioned activities will be
restricted to an unpredictable degree. The result could substantially,
even catastrophically, affect interstate commerce.
Congress recognized the potential harm that would be caused by
inadequate regulation of waterways and in response it promulgated the
CWA. 198 The CWA is a very detailed and far-reaching statute that at-
tempts to create a comprehensive framework for regulating the means by
which waterways can be used so as to prevent these types of situations
from arising. The Corps's interpretation of its jurisdiction under section
404 of the CWA does not push the outer limits of Congress's commerce
power, but rather fits squarely within the conception of Congress's au-
thority advanced by the Court in Raich. Thus, given what we know
about the interconnected and cyclical nature of water systems, it seems
clear that regulating these wetlands is within Congress's purview under
the Commerce Clause.
Some scholars have argued that Congress's power to regulate chan-
nels of commerce should be extended to include the power to regulate
activities that will substantially affect the channels themselves, distinct
from its power to regulate activities that will substantially affect inter-
196 Id.
197 Breedon, supra note 30, at 1462 (citing Matthew Baumgartner, Note, SWANCC's
Clear Statement: A Delimitation of Congress' Commerce Clause Authority to Regulate Water
Pollution, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2137, 2152 (2005)).
198 See 33 U.S.C. § 1251.
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state commerce as a whole. 199 This approach has also been endorsed by
some courts.
The power to regulate channels of commerce includes "the power to
regulate activities affecting the suitability of a channel's use for trans-
porting goods or persons in interstate commerce. '200 Some courts have
held that this power includes "the authority to regulate activities that mis-
use or harm interstate channels of commerce, including navigable wa-
ters," and "may be used to reach intrastate, non-economic activities that
misuse or harm interstate channels of commerce. ' 20 1 "[Clongressional
power to regulate the channels and instrumentalities of commerce in-
cludes the power to prohibit their use for harmful purposes, even if the
targeted harm itself occurs outside the flow of commerce and is purely
local in nature. '20 2 The argument is thus that the regulation of navigable
waters under the CWA is an exercise of congressional power to regulate
channels of commerce and that this congressional power gives rise to a
derivative authority to regulate non-navigable tributaries and adjacent
wetlands as a "legitimate means of protecting the nation's navigable wa-
ters against misuse. '20 3
The Court's 2005 decision in Raich seemed to suggest that it was
more prepared than it had been to accept this kind of broad conception of
Congress's Commerce Clause power. Raich was a marked departure
from Lopez and Morrison, "arguably signal[ing] a return to increased
judicial deference to federal legislation regulating purely intrastate mat-
ters, where the legislation is enacted pursuant to Congress's power to
regulate activities substantially affecting interstate commerce. ' '2° 4 Even
in light of serious concerns about federal intrusion on areas of traditional
state sovereignty, "Raich suggests that not all intrastate concerns tradi-
tionally reserved to state regulation should necessarily remain so, partic-
ularly where Congress has enacted a comprehensive statutory
scheme. '20 5 The Court should have used this model in Rapanos to up-
hold the Corps's jurisdiction.
199 Id. at 1443.
200 Id. it 1457; see also United States v. Thorson, No. 03-C-0074, 2004 WL 737522, at
*1 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 6, 2004).
201 Breedon, supra note 30, at 1457-58; see also Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S.
470, 491 (1917) ("[T]he authority of Congress to keep the channels of interstate commerce
free from immoral and injurious uses has been frequently sustained."); Perez v. United States,
402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971) (Congress may regulate "the use of channels of interstate ... com-
merce which Congress deems are being misused."); United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698,
707 (4th Cir. 2003) ("[T]here is no reason to believe that Congress has less power over naviga-
ble waters than over other interstate channels such as highways, which may be regulated to
prevent their 'immoral and injurious use[ ].'") (quoting Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 491).
202 U.S. v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1218, 1226 (2005).
203 Breedon, supra note 30, at 1461.
204 Id.
205 Id. at 1462.
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At the heart of Rapanos is a struggle between the need to preserve
an ecosystem which performs essential functions and which is disappear-
ing at the rate of hundreds of thousands of acres per year, on the one
hand,206 and individual communities' need for the employment and tax
revenue that comes from developing wetland real estate, on the other. 20 7
This tension makes a strong case for a prominent federal role in wetlands
protection. 208 Yet local governments seem best equipped to understand
local needs and the relationship between particular wetlands and local
economies. At the very least, it seems clear that wetlands regulation will
work best with active participation from state and local governments. 2°9
In addition, although the Rapanos decision may not be doctrinally con-
sistent with Raich, the plurality's reasoning does have some persuasive
power. As Justice Scalia noted, when one considers a hydrological
model in which all wetlands affect the water bodies around them, "even
the most insubstantial hydrologic connection may be held to constitute a
'significant nexus.' "210
Particularly in light of this reluctance on the part of the Court to
allow the Corps the kind of authority necessary for a truly effective fed-
eral wetlands protection program, a legislative solution aimed at foster-
ing the development of strong state wetlands protection programs is an
important step.
At least one scholar has suggested that Congress should specifically
amend the CWA so as to give the Corps jurisdiction over isolated and
adjacent wetlands in order to recreate the wetlands protection lost as a
result of SWANCC.21' In response to the Court's decision in SWANCC,
Congress attempted to do just that. The 107th Congress introduced, but
did not enact, the Clean Water Authority Restoration Act of 2002.212
This bill would have deleted the term navigable from the CWA, codify-
ing the Corps's regulations defining its jurisdiction over "waters of the
United States. ' 213 The bill was reintroduced by the 108th Congress as
206 By the end of the twentieth century, fewer than half of the estimated 215 million acres
of wetlands which existed in America at the time of European discovery remained. See Houck
& Rolland, supra note 16, at 1251.
207 See id at 1252.
208 Id.
209 Id. at 1244.
210 Rapanos v. United States, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 2218 (2006).
211 See, e.g., Colby, supra note 18, at 1057-58.
212 Clean Water Authority Restoration Act of 2002, S. 2780, 107th Cong. (2002); Clean
Water Authority Restoration Act of 2002, H.R. 5194, 107th Cong. (2002); Colby, supra note
18, at 1058. These bills contained various congressional findings responding to the Supreme
Court's decision in SWANCC, such as findings detailing the ways in which pollution of intra-
state waters can affect covered waters of the United States. S. 2780; H.R. 5194. This suggests
that Congress understood its authority for the bill as based at least partially in its Commerce
Clause power to regulate channels of commerce. Colby, supra note 18, at 1059.
213 Colby, supra note 18, at 1058-59.
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the Clean Water Authority Restoration Act of 2003,214 but again not
enacted. 215
There are several problems with this approach. First, although the
Court has thus far declined to directly address the Commerce Clause is-
sue lurking in the background of these cases, 216 the Court's dicta in
Rapanos and its other recent CWA cases suggest that it might strike
down such legislation as unconstitutional. 217 The Court's decisions in
United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison mark a distinct
change in its Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The Court had steadily
expanded Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause over the
course of nearly a century, but it suddenly curtailed that power in Lopez
and Morrison. The Court's decision in Gonzales v. Raich did appear to
reverse or at least limit that new trend, but the fact that the Court was
unwilling to accept Corps jurisdiction in Rapanos v. United States, even
after Gonzalez v. Raich, suggests that the Court is likely to apply a rela-
tively narrow, Lopez-like interpretation of the Commerce Clause to this
kind of amendment, particularly to the extent that the amendment is justi-
fied under Congress's power to regulate intrastate activities having a sub-
stantial effect on interstate commerce.218
VI. SECTION 319 AND THE NFIP: POTENTIAL
COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM SOLUTIONS
There is, perhaps, a more important reason why an amendment to
the CWA returning the Corps's jurisdiction to pre-SWANCC and Rapa-
nos conditions is not the best approach to solving the wetlands preserva-
tion problem. Arguments pointing to the interconnected and cyclical
nature of all water systems and highlighting the importance of wetlands
preservation are emotionally appealing and ecologically sound. Even
before SWANCC in 2001, wetlands were steadily disappearing,219 indi-
cating that the protection section 404 offered when it was at its strongest
was, while certainly valuable, less than optimal. This suggests that a
federal pollution statute is simply not the best mechanism for preserving
wetlands, and the Corps is not the best steward of environmental preser-
vation. The underlying federalism concerns expressed by the Court in
SWANCC and Rapanos v. United States are valid, and wetland protection
needs to come, at least in part, from state or local governments which can
214 Id.; Clean Water Authority Restoration Act of 2003, S. 473, 108th Cong. (2003);
Clean Water Authority Restoration Act of 2003, H.R. 962, 108th Cong. (2003).
215 Colby, supra note 18, at 1058-59.
216 Id. at 1060-61.
217 Id. at 1061 n.234 (comparing different scholars' opinions about the future of environ-
mental legislation based on Congress's Commerce Clause power).
218 Id. at 1060.
219 See, e.g., supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
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better understand the particular challenges facing their own municipali-
ties and regions.
Rather than searching for ways to use federal agencies to protect
wetlands, Congress should implement legislation that seeks to incen-
tivize states to implement their own wetland protection programs. There
are a variety of ways in which Congress could accomplish this objective.
Section 319 of the CWA contains a voluntary grant program allowing
states that develop non-point source pollution management programs to
apply for federal funding to assist either in implementing that pro-
gram, 220 or in implementing groundwater protection activities that will
advance the goals of non-point source pollution management pro-
grams.22' Because this is a voluntary program, Congress could easily
amend it so as to include a requirement that applicant states include
meaningful wetlands conservation provisions in their non-point source
protection programs.
While there seems to be little downside to such a scheme since par-
ticipation in the section 319 grant program is voluntary, lack of uniform
participation and enforcement difficulties would likely pose problems.
Another federal statute that could be used as a platform for prompting
states to implement successful wetland conservation programs is the Na-
tional Flood Insurance Act (NFIA). 222 In response to the devastating
flooding associated with Hurricane Betsy in 1965, the Act created the
National Flood Insurance Plan (NFIP),2 23 whose ostensible purposes
were to protect individual landowners from flood loss by making flood
insurance more widely available than it had been 224 and to reduce gov-
ernment expenditures on flood relief by promoting sound land use poli-
cies that minimize exposure to flood risks. 225 Because floodplain
management and land use regulations are largely the domain of state and
local governments, the NFIP took a market-based approach, hoping to
use the promise of flood coverage to incentivize communities to enact
desirable policies.226 A community is eligible for participation in the
program only if it can demonstrate that it has adopted floodplain man-
220 33 U.S.C. § 1329(h) (1998).
221 Id. § 1329(i).
222 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4129 (2000).
223 FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM 1-2
(2002) [hereinafter NFIP DESCRIP'TION].
224 Id.
225 Id. at 2; see also Beverly v. Macy, 702 F.2d 931, 937 (Ala. 1983) (holding that the
NFIP was in part intended to encourage state and local governments to develop effective land
use policies, thereby minimizing the burden of flood disaster relief on the federal government).
But see Schell v. Nat'l Flood Insurers Ass'n, 520 F.Supp. 150, 154 (1981) (holding that the
NFIP is directed at compensating, rather than preventing, flood damages).
226 NFIP DESCRIIrON, supra note 225, at 2.
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agement regulations that comport with a set of minimum eligibility crite-
ria set forth by FEMA.22
7
The NFIP has several attributes that make it a useful mechanism for
protecting wetlands. First, flooding and wetlands are intimately con-
nected. One of the most important natural functions of a wetland is to
retain water during rain events and release it later, thus preventing and
reducing flooding. 228 When wetlands are destroyed, these mitigating
functions are lost, increasing flood damage. Second, from a policy per-
spective, wetland management is much more intuitively a land use issue
than a pollution issue, even though the connections between wetlands
and water pollution are quite clear from a scientific perspective. 229 Thus,
an NFIP program that included wetland protection in addition to section
404 of the CWA would be more effective than section 404 alone and
would serve as a truly comprehensive wetland protection scheme.
With an ecologically-and hydrologically-based conception of
wetlands as flood mitigators in mind, Congress should adjust the NFIP to
incorporate wetland protection as a goal. In section 4102(c) of the NFIA,
Congress lays out a set of basic criteria that state and local plans must
meet in order to qualify for the program.230 The last of these criteria is a
catch-all provision, to "otherwise improve the long-range land manage-
ment and use of flood-prone areas. ' '231 The idea of wetland protection is
implicit in this provision, but Congress should take the step of adding an
explicit requirement that communities wishing to participate in the NFIP
must institute a reasonable wetland preservation scheme to section
4102(c).
CONCLUSION
The devastating flooding that followed Hurricane Katrina happened
in part because the wetlands along the Louisiana Gulf coast that should
have been able to mitigate the flooding are disappearing. 232 Katrina
227 Id.
228 See supra Part I.
229 It is presumably in some significant part because wetland management involves land
use, an area of traditional state sovereignty, that the Supreme Court has been resistant to at-
tempts to use the Clean Water Act to engage in comprehensive wetland management
programs.
230 As the NFIA currently reads, adequate State and local measures must:
(1) constrict the development of land which is exposed to flood damage where
appropriate,
(2) guide the development of proposed construction away from locations which are
threatened by flood hazards,
(3) assist in reducing damage caused by floods, and
(4) otherwise improve the long-range land management and use of flood-prone areas.
42 U.S.C. § 4102(c) (2000).
231 Id. § 4102(c)(4).
232 See sources cited supra note 5.
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demonstrated what a deeply human issue wetlands preservation can be.
In doing so, it highlighted the importance of resolving the inherent con-
flict between the interests of developers and the need for wetlands pres-
ervation. Continued development of coastal land and extreme weather
patterns generated by global climate change are going to make flood
management an increasingly difficult task. There can be no question that
truly active wetlands restoration and protection are necessary if events
such as those that took place in New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina
are not to become increasingly familiar.
In choosing to support development interests, the Supreme Court in
Rapanos v. United States ignored an overwhelming body of scientific
evidence sustaining the crucial functions of wetlands and the dramatic
impact they have on other, more traditionally "navigable" bodies of
water.2 33 In addition, the Court ignored Congress's intent when it
promulgated the CWA, which was to institute a regulatory scheme that
would be comprehensive and far-reaching enough to protect the integrity
of the nation's water systems as a whole. In sum, the Court ignored all
the pressing reasons for a strong federal role in wetlands protection.
The federalism concerns expressed by the Court are real ones, how-
ever, and at the very least it must be said that in light of the Court's
decision in Rapanos v. United States, a legislative approach that insti-
tutes a cooperative federalism scheme has the best chance of success.
Congress should use a land use statute, like the NFIA, as a platform for
encouraging states to develop strong wetland protection programs. By
tying the availability of flood insurance to these programs, the federal
government can encourage much needed preservation without risk of
running afoul of an unduly narrow interpretation of the Commerce
Clause. Through the successful protection of wetlands, the United States
can hope to minimize recurrences of the kind of devastation that fol-
lowed Hurricane Katrina.
233 See supra Part I.

